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It is well known that inter-generational transfers can be
suppported by subgame perfect equilibria in Samuelson's
consumption loan model if every generation is perfectly
informed about past events. This paper relaxes the perfect
information assumption minimally, and finds that transfers
cannot be supported by pure-atrategy sequential equilibria if
the transferable commodity is finitely divisible. Mixed
strategies allow transfers to be sustained, so that a version
of the Folk theorem holds with informational constraints.
However, these equilibria are not robust. If each agent's
utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation,
these mixed strategy equilibria unravel, and only the zero-
transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable
outcome. These results extend when we allow the commodity to be
perfectly divisible, and also apply to a class of repeated
games played by overlapping generations of players which
includes the prisoners' dilemma. We suggest that money may play
an informational role in this context, as a device for
overcoming the boundedness of social memory.
Keywords: dynamic games of imperfect information,
purification of mixed strategies, information and
complexity, money and information.
~ Address for correspondence: until 15 December 1994: CentER
for Economic Research, Tilburg, email: bhaskarc~kub.nl. 16 Dec
1994 - June 1995: Dept. del Analisis Economico, Universidad de
Alicante, Campus San Vicente, 03071, Spain.
I am grateful to Eric van Damme, Dilip Mookherjee and to
audiences at Alicante, CentER, the Delhi School of Economica
and the Indian Statistical Institute, for their comments.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Samuelson's (1958) overlapping generations model has
rightly been described as "one of the most original and
stimulating contributions to modern economic theory" (Shell,
1971). Consider the following simple version of this model of
an infinitely lived economy. In each period, a single agent is
born and lives for two periods. The young agent is endowed with
two units of an indivisible and perishable consumption good -
fish for example. The old agent is without any endowment. The
economy begins at date one with a single old agent and a young
agent. In each period, the young agent may consume both fish or
she may give one to her mother. The old agent is passive, and
has no choices to make. Agents are selfish, and prefer more
consumption to less, but they would rather have the same total
consumption spread out so as to not starve when old.
This economy has a unique Walrasian equilibrium, where
each young agent consumes her endowment when young and starves
when old. This equilibrium is autarchic; no trades are possible
between generationa since the old do not have any endowment to
trade with. This equilibrium is also inefficient, and is
(strictly) Pareto dominated by the allocation where every
young agent gives one fish to her mother. The overlapping
generations model hence provides an instance where the first
welfare theorem fails to apply. 1
Samuelson observed that the social contrivance of money
could allow society to enforce the Pareto-efficient allocation.
Let the old agent in the first period isaue "money", and offer
this money in exchange for one fish. Let every young agent2
accept this money in exchange for one fish. If any agent fails
to secure this money by giving a fish to her mother, this agent
will receive nothing when she is old - should she issue her own
money, this will not be accepted. Accepting money and
transferring the good is clearly a Nash equilibrium. The
overlapping generations model has hence provided an extremely
~
influential theory of money.
From the perspective of non-cooperative game theory, the
monetary equilibrium provides what is perhaps the simplest
example of "history-dependent" behavior in a dynamic game.
Money is not really required for this etory, and one can simply
conaider the dyanamic game where each young agent chooses from
the set of poasible tranafere {0,1}. It is clear that the
monetary equilibrium corresponds to a Nash equilibrium - each
agent transfera 1 since by doing so ahe aecures a transfer of
1, whilst ahe geta 0 if she ahe transfers 0. If every agent
observes the entire history of past actions, the Nash
equilibrium supporting the efficient allocation can be made
subgame perfect, as Hammond (1975) observed. Although there are
infinitely many ways of constructing such a perfect pure
atrategy equilibrium, perhaps the aimplest is the strategy
profile GRIM. Each agent transfers one fiah to her mother if
all previoua agents have done so. If any agent fail to provide
for her mother, all aucceeding agents transfer zero. A more
attractive aubgame perfect equilibrium is the RESILIENT
atrategy profile, where agent puniahes her mother if and only
if she is a"deviant", where a deviant ia one who has
transferred zero when ahe should have given one fiah to her3
mother. Each of these strategy profiles can be implemented by a
simple two-state automotan, as Fig. 1 showa. The basic idea,
that an overlapping generationa structure allows fínitely lived
playera to cooperate, has been extended to general repeated
games with overlapping generations of players - see Cremer
(1986), Kandori (1992), Salant (1991) and Smith (1992).
Although the strategy profiles GRIM and RESILIENT are very
simple, and require only two states, this paper will show that
they are nevertheless informationally very demanding, and
require infinite memory. This may seem surprising since
complexity measures (as in Abreu and Rubinstein (1988)) and
informational requirementa seem cloaely related - one strategy
is defined to be simpler than another strategy if the former
is measurable with respect to a coaraer information partition,
i.e. uses lesa information. Complexity measures are however
controversial - for example, Lipman and Srivastava (1991)
auggest that the number of states measure is too aimplistic. We
shall see in thia paper that there is a sharp disjunction
between the simplicity of a strategy (as in Abreu-Rubinstein)
and the informational requirementa of a atrategy.
This paper proceeds by incorporating informational
constraints directly. These informational limitationa arise
naturally in the overlapping generations context. The
assumption that an agent who is born today has perfect
information about all past events ia patently unrealistic. Each
agent has little direct information about the past, and what
information she has is filtered through past generations. One
may of course relax the perfect information asaumption ín a4
variety of ways. For example, social memory could be uniformly
bounded, so that any agent has information only about the
actions taken by the last m agents, where m is some natural
number. Alternatively, m could be increasing over time (t), as
our historians become more adept, although our lack of
knowledge about the past, t-m, could also be increasing. The
analysis of this paper applies to a very general type of
imperfect information, which includes all the above
possibilities. Perfect information implies that every agent is
omniscient and knows the entire past. It also implies that any
agent is omnifamous - each one of an infinity of future agents
is fully informed about her actions. The analysis of this paper
applies to any information structure where there are infinitely
many agents who are not omnifamous. It also applies to a class
of repeated gamea played by overlapping genérations of players
which includes the prisoners' dilemma.
The main results of our analysis are as follows. We first
analyze pure strategy sequential equilibria, and show that
informational constraints have dramatic implications - inter-
generational transfers cannot be sustained, and outcomes must
be Markovian, i.e. not history dependent. This is illustriated
by a simple example, ín section 2, and more formally in section
3. In section 4 we consider mixed strategies, with
diametrically opposite results - randomized punishments can
support the efficient allocation even if information is
severely limited. These mixed strategies however turn out to be
fragile. In section 5 we perturb the overlapping generations
economy in the manner of Harsanyi (1973). All agents are ex5
ante identical, but each agent's utility function is subject to
a small random shock, the realization of which ia private
information. We show that the randomized punishments which
support transfers unravel, and the unique rationalizable
outcome which survives is the one where every agent consumes
her entire endowment. Such a striking result does not even
require us to invoke the equilibrium asaumption, and holds
even if one considers sequentially rationalizable strategies.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that the Harsanyi
perturbation has been used to refíne equilibria in an extensive
form game.
Sections 2-5 asaume that the tranaferable commodity is
finitely divisible, so that each agent's action set is finite.
Section 6 relaxes this asaumption, and showa that the results
are qualitatively the same. With perfect divisibility, there
are pure strategy equilibria which support transfers, but once
again these equilibria do not survive when we perturb the
agent's utility function. Theae negative results lead us to
consider alternative information structures. In section 7 we
conaider the possible informational role of money, as a device
for overcoming the boundedness of social memory. We find that
money may allow the efficient allocation to be auppported, but
the equilibrium which supports this is necessarily GRIM, ao
that if any agent deviatea from this equilibrium, the economy
never returns to the efficient path. This providea a theory of
crises of confidence based on the informational role of money.
The final section concludes.6
2. AN EXAMPLE
We present a simple example which illustrates the problem
in supporting inter-generational transfers. As in the
introduction each young agent is endowed with two fish. She may
give one to her mother or none, so that the set of possible
transfers she could make is A-{0,1} (we assume that
preferences are such that transferring 2 and consuming 0 is
strictly dominated and may be ruled out). All agents have
identical preferences, and the utility u(a,a') where a is the
transfer made by the agent when young and a' is the transfer
received by her when old, satisfies:
u(0,1) ~ u(1,1) ~ u(0,0) ~ u(1,0) (2.1)
Let m- 2, so that any agent only observes the last two
actions taken. Let the first agent transfer 1 and the second
agent simply match the action of the first agent. This implies
that the first two agents will transfer 1. After t-3, every
agent observes the actions of the two previous agents. Hence
for t~2, the agent's strategy st, specifies the action to be
taken for every possible pair of actions last observed. we
restrict attention to pure strategies, and to strategy profiles
where st - st}1 - s for t~l, i.e. all agents after period 2
adopt the same strategy. Since m-2, there are 4 possible
obaerved hiatories.
Since we are interested in the possibility of supporting
transfera, the strategy must choose 1 after observing (1,1). To
sustain this, we must punish a deviator; hence we must choose 0
after (1,0). With these determined, we can fill in the choices
after (0,0) and (0,1) in four different ways. These allow four7
possible strategies, which we label I, II, III and IV. Table 1
shows what happens to a player after any of the four possible
observed histories if every agent adopts the same strategy.
Given any observed history, the strategy determines the action
taken by the ager.t at date t, and thereby also the information
of the agent at date ttl, which we call the the "induced
history". The induced history and the strategy determine the
"next-period action, i.e. the action taken at ttl. The actions
at t and ttl determine the utility of the agent at t. Table 1
shows why each of these four strategies fails to be
sequentially rational, since there is one observed history at
which the agent at t can deviate profitably, given that the
agent at ttl is following the strategy. Consider atrategy I
which is "nice", and chooses zero only after observing (1,0).
This is not optimal if the observed history is (0,0), since the
agent still gets 1 the next period if she chooses 0 rather than
1. II on the other hand is "grim", and chooses 0 at every state
except (1,1). This is too grim; after (0,1), the agent prefers
to choose 1 rather than 0. By choosing 1, she ensures that the
hiatory next period is (1,1), thereby ensuring a transfer to
herself. III and IV are intermediate; they choose 1 after two
of the four histories. They too fail, and interestingly, both
fail to be optimal after the history (0,0). III calls the
player to choose 0, but it is preferable to deviate to 1, since
this ensures a transfer of 1 in the next period. IV chooaes 1
after (0,0), but the player can deviate to 0 without being
punished.8
It might be conjectured that the problem arises because we
have required every agent to choose the same strategy. However,
this is not the case, and removing this restriction does not
improve matters. Nor is the case of m-2 particularly special -
the point generalizes to m- two million. The problem arises
since each agent has better information about the past than her
daughter. To support transfers we must reward "altruistic"
behavior and punish selfish behavior. This requires that the
agent at tt1 must vary her behavior in a non-trivial way
depending upon the information she observes. However, the agent
at t can manipulate the information that her daughter receives.
Any pure strategy profile aimed at supporting transfers either
turns out to be too grim or too nice, and any attempt to
rectify one problem only brings in the other problem.
We turn now to a formal analysis of the model.
3. PiJKE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
We consider an economy over periods 1,2,... The t-th agent
is born in period t, and is YOUNG in period t, and OLD in tfl.
Her endowment is e when she is young and 0 when she is old. The
young agent chooses an action from a finite set A, where a E A
representa the amount the agent transfers to agent t-1. Given
a, agent t's consumption at date t is (e-a). The old agent has
no choicea to make.
The finiteness of A can be justified since it is
physically impossible to have an infinitely divisible
commodity. In addition, indivisibilities may be enhanced for
informational reasons: subsequent generations may not be able9
to observe t's transfer as finely as t can.
The agent's utility u, is a function, u:AxA-)R, where
u(a,a') is the agent's utility when ahe transfers a units to
her mother and recieves a' units from her daughter, i.e. it is
the utïlity from consuming (e-a} units when young and a' units
when old. We assume that u(.) is decreasing in its first
argument, the transfer made by the agent. If A has k elements,
the agent's utility function can also be identified with a
point in
R2k.
Although our focus is on Samuelson's consumption-loan
model, all our resulta and analysis apply to a class of
repeated games played by overlapping generations of players.
Consider a stage game consisting of two roles, YOUNG and OLD;
of associated action sets A and C; and payoff functions
vy:AxC)R, vo:CxA-)R. There is one player who is born in
every period, and who lives for two periods, assuming role
YOUNG in the first period, and role OLD in the second. Players
seek to maximize the sum of payoffs over their lifetime,
possibly disounted by a rate S. Consider the class of stage
games where role OLD has a strictly dominant action, which we
label D. This class includes the repeated prisoners' dilemma
played by overlapping generations of players, considered for
example by Smith (1992). Obviously, every player must choose
action D when old in any equilibrium. Given this, a player's
lifetime utility depends only upon the action she takes when
she is young and the action that the young player takes when
she is old. Hence define the payoff function, u:AxA)R as
follows:10
u(a,a') - vy(a,D) t Svo(D,a')
Since OLD has a strictly dominant action, this must always
be chosen, and we need consider only the action taken by the
player when young. Hence all the results of this paper will
apply to this class of games as well. Note that in this case
(3.1) implies that u(.) is additively separable in its two
arguments.
Our first assumption on preferences follows from the
preceding discussion.
Asscanption P1 u(a,a') is either decreasing in its first
argument or additively separable.
For this section and the next we make the following
regularity assumption regarding u, that distinct action vectors
yield different utility. Since the set of actions is finite
this assumption will be satisfied almost always.
Asswnption P2 Let w, z e A2. If u(w) - u(z), then w- z.
Note that P1 and P2 imply that argmax u(a,a') is unique
aeA
and independent of a'; label this action 0- in the consumption
loan model, this corresponds to transferring zero. In the
prisoners' dilemma, 0 corresponds to "defect". P1 and P2 imply
that this overlapping generations economy has a unique Markov
equilibrium, where every agent chooses 0. (A Markov equilibrium




The focus of this paper is on relaxing the assumption that11
social memory is perfect, i.e. that each generation has all the
information about the past that its predeceasors had. There are
a number of plausible ways in which one may introduce imperfect
information. For instance, social memory may be uniformly
bounded by a natural number m, which couid be very large. The
agent at date t has perfect information about the actions of
all previous agents if t-1 c m. Otherwise, ahe is informed
about the actions of the last m agents. Alternatively, the
bound on social memory may not be uniform, and memory could
increase over time. Agent t is informed about actions taken in
the last m(t) periods. m(t) could be increasing, although
forgetting also takes place, i.e. (t-1) - m(t) also increases
sufficiently often. In this case social memory is not bounded
above. The results of our paper apply to theae examplea of
imperfect social memory. We generalize as follows.
The history at period t, ht is the sequence of preceding
actions, (a1,a2,...,at 1). The history at period 1 is the null
history, hl. Ht is the set of all possible histories at t, i.e.
Ht - At-1. Consider a pair of agents, i,j with j~i, and define
the following:
ai(hj) is the i-th component of hj, i.e. the action taken
by player i.
hi(hj) is the element of Hi which corresponds to hj, i.e.
it is the first i-1 components of hj.
hj~ai is the history which results when the i-th component
of hj is subsitituted by ai.
Let Bj be the information partitíon of agent j, with
typical element bj. Bj is a partition of Hj. If the history at12
j is hj, agent j is informed that hj belongs to bj(hj). We
call bj the observed history, and Bj the set of observable
histories.
If j~i, let Bji denote the partiton that Bj induces on
Hi, with typical element bji. If bje Bj , we define bji(bj,i)
as follows:
bji(bj,i) -{hi: 3 hj E bj and hi - hi(hj)}
Bji defines the information player j has about events
prior to date i. Our first assumption says that if player j
comes after player i, j has (weakly) less information about
events prior to date i than i has.
Ass~ption M1 If j~i, Bji is (weakly) a coarsening of Bi.
our second assumption limits the information that players
have about the past. Players are assumed to be omniscient and
know the entire past if the game has perfect information. It is
more fruitful to invert this perspective - under perfect
information, for any player i, each one of an infinity of
succeeding players is informed about her actions, i.e. i is, to
coin a term, omnifamous. To define this, we first define the
notion of being uninformed about the actions of a previous
player.
Definition 3.1 Let j~i. Player j is uninformed about
player í if, V hj E Hj, V ai,aí E A:
bj (hj~ai) - bj (hj~ai)
Let 91(i) denote the set of players with index greater than
i who are uninformed about player i.
Definition 3.2 Agent i is not omnífamous if there exists
an agent j, j~i, such that j E 91(i).13
Agent i is omnifamo[ts if every succeeding agent is
informed of her actions. Agent i is not omnifamo[rs if there is
some succeeding agent who is not informed about i's actions. It
seems reasonable to assume that every agent is not omnifamous.
We need a milder assumption, under which most agents could well
be omnifamous.
Asstnnption M2 There are infinitely many agents who are
not omnifamous.
The following equivalence relation on Bj will play an
important role in our analysis:
Definition 3.3 Given a aet Bj, and i c j, -i is an
equivalence relation on Bj such that for any bj, b~ E Bj:
bj-i b~ iff 3 ai E A: bj~ai - b~
bj and b~ are i-equivalent if the information regarding
the actions of every agent except agent i is the same. Note
that for every pair (j,i), with icj, the equivalence relation
-i is defined on the set Bj. If j is uninformed about i, bj and
b~ are i-equivalent only if they are identical.
Strategies
A pure strategy for agent t is a function st:Bt~A, i.e.
it is a function which is measurable with respect to the
partition Bt. Agent t's pure strategy set, St, is the set of
all such functions. Given any bt in Bt, we write st(bt) for
the element of A which is induced by bt when st is played. A
strategy profile, s, is a infinite sequence cst~ where st e St
Vt.
Given any observed history, bt, an action by agent t, at,
induces an observed history for ttl, which we write as14
bt}1(at,bt), or simply as (at,bt). Any pure strategy also
defines a function from the set of observable histories at t,
Bt, to the set of observable hístories at tfl, Bt}1. Write
bt~l(st,bt) or simply (st,bt) for (st(bt),bt). Given a strategy
profile s, the realized history at t, bt(s), is the element of
Bt which is induced when s is played. Similarly, given s, t~L,
and an observed history bt, the realized history at t given bz,
bt(s,bT), is the element of Bt which is índuced when s is
played after bi.
Write st}l~bt for the map from A to itself which is
defined by the pair bt and st}1. The interpretation is that if
agent t takes action a e A after history bt, agent tfl takes
action st}1(a,bt). This map defines agent t's utility from
action a after history bt as follows:
ut(a'sttl,bt) - u (a' sttl(bttl(a,bt)] (3.2)
The agent's utility from the strategy st, given st}1 and
bt is:
u(st'sttl~bt) - u [st(bt), sttl(bttl(st,bt)] (3.3)
Observe that agent t's utility is affected directly only
by her own action and the action of agent ttl. Agent t's
utility is affected indirectly by the actions of agents t-i,
i-1,2,...t-1, since these actions determine the observed
history. Agent t's utility is unaffected by the actions of
agents at dates after ttl.
A strategy profile s is a sequentially rational equilibrium
(abbreviated to equilibrium henceforth) if dt, dbte Bt,
u(at,sttllbt) ~ u(a,sttl,bt) V a e A (3.4)
Remark: Our equilibrium definition is remarkably simple.15
We do not have to invoke any beliefs regarding past actions, as
is usual in games of imperfect information, since past actions
do not directly affect current or future utility. Further,
given assumption M1, the information partition of agent t
regardir.g the past is always finer than the information
partitions of agent tfk regarding the past (i.e. events before
t) .
We now define the following notion of ineasurability of a
strategy with respect to a partition, which will play an
important role in the proof of our theorem in this section.
Definition 3.4 Given j~i, and the equivalence relation -
i
on Bj, sj is measurable vith respect to -i if :
bj -i b~ a sj (bj )- sj (b~ )
We now state the main result of this section:
Theorem 1. The overlapping generations game has a unique
pure strategy equilibrium where each agent chooses 0.
Proof By assumption M2 we can find an agent with an
arbitrarily large index i who is not omnifamous. Hence 3 j~i
such that j E 11(i) . We show, by backward induction, that for
all t, i ~ t ~ j, that st does not condition on agent i's
behavior. More precisely, we show that st is measurable w.r.t.
for all t in this range. -i'
i) sj is measurable w.r.t. -i : This follows since j e
~1(i), and hence , induces the trivial (finest possible)
partition of Bj, where each set in the partition is a
singleton set.
ii)Let i ~ t ~ j. If st}1 is measurable w.r.t. -i , then
st is measurable w.r.t. -i .16
Note first that by Mi, if bt -i bt and a e A, then:
bttl(a,bt) -i bttl(a,bC)
i.e. if player t takes the same action a at two i-
equivalent observed histories bt and bt, the resulting observed
histories for player ttl are also i-equivalent.
We claim that if st}1 is measurable w.r.t. -i and bt ~i
bt, then:
ut(st' sttl ,bt) - ut(st' sttl ~bt) (3.5)
Suppose not. Let ut(st, st}1 ~bt) ' ut(st' sttl
~bt). Then
st(bt) is not optimal, since by choosing the action st(bt),
agent t ensures the history bt}1(st(bt),bt). Since bt -i bt'
bttl(st(bt),bt) -i bttl(st(bt),bt)
(3.6)
Since sttl is measurable w.r.t. -i, agent t ensures that
ttl takea the same action, and hence the payoff ut(st,
st}l~bt). Hence if cst~ is a equilibrium, (3.3) must hold. If
(3.3) applies, Aasumption P2 implies that st(bt) cannot be
distinct from st(bt). Hence st is measurable w.r.t. -i.
(i) and (ii) together imply that if agent i is not
omnifamous, agent itl's actions do not depend upon i's actions.
From assumptions P1 and P2, agent i must choose 0 irrespective
of the observed history. By backward induction it now follows
that V t~i, st- 0 irrespective of the observed history. o
Remark 1: The negative result can be generalized, to the
case of extensive form rationalizable strategies, provided that
one requirea that players have "point-beliefs" about the pure
strategies played by succeeding agents. However, the point17
belief assumption is hardly plausible outside an equilibrium
context, and we defer the analysis of rationalizable strategies
(to section 5), after analyzing mixed strategies.
We offer the following intuition for Theorem 1. If
altruistic behavior is- to be supported, agents must vary their
behavior depending upon the observed history. Since the
strategy profile is pure, this implies that the agent's utility
under the strategy profile differs depending upon the history
they have observed. However, each agent has better information
about the past than the succeeding agent, and this allows her
to manipulate the information that is transmitted. The only way
in which this informational advantage can be nullified is if
the strategy profile does not condition upon information at
all. This intuition suggesta that mixed strategies may be able
to overcome the problem, and we turn to these.
4. MIXED STRATEGIES
Theorem 1 applies to pure strategies. In this section we
ask, is it possible to support efficient outcomes by the use of
randomized punishments? We find that the answer is yes, and
that in fact one can prove a version of the Folk theorem even
for economies where information is severely limited.
Let argmax u(a,a) .- 1 be the efficient action. By
aeA
assumption P2, this is unique. The following assumption is made
for convenience; otherwise the results of this section hold
trivially.
Asswnption P3 1 ~ 0is
The following lemma is straight-forward:
Lemma 4.1 u(0,1) ~ u(1,1) ~ u(0,0) ~ u(1,0)
Proof The first and last inequalities are implied by P1
and P2. The second inequality is implied by P3. o
In the consumption loan model, if u(.) is increasing in
its second argument (i.e. the transfer received by the agent),
u(0,0) is the agent's individually rational payoff, and hence
the interval (u(0,0),u(1,1] is the set of individually rational
and feasible payoffs. The following theorem is therefore
similar to a Folk theorem with informational constraints.
Theorem 2. If each agent observes the action taken by the
previous agent, the efficient path where every agent chooses 1
can be supported as an equilibrium by the use of randomized
punishments. Any payoff between the efficient payoff u(1,1) and
u(0,0) is an equilibrium payoff.
Proof We construct a class of equilibrium strategies which
randomize between the actions 0 and 1, and the randomization
probability depends only upon the action taken by the preceding
agent. Let p1 ~ 1 and p0 ~ 0 be numbers satisfying:
pl - u(0,0) - u(1,0) } u(0,1) - u(0,0) p0 (4.1)
u(1,1) - u(1,0) u(1,1) - u(0,0)
Lemma 4.1 ensures that p0 and pl lie in the unit interval.
Let p1 (resp. p0) represent the local strategy of choosing
action 1 with probability pl (resp. p0) and action 0 with
probability (1-pl) (reap. (1-p0). Define the strategy profile
~st~ as follows:19
st - pl if t- 1 or at-1 - 1
- p0 if t~ 1 and at 1~ 1
Since st}1 does not condition upon at 1, ut is independent
of at 1. Hence for any observed history bt, we have:
ut(l,sttl,bt) - pl u(1,1) t(1-pl) u(1,0) (4.2)
If a ~ 1,
ut(a,stfl,bt) - p0 u(a,l) t(1-p0) u(0,0) (4.3)
By assumption P1, the expression in (4.3) is maximized at
a- 0. It is easy to verify that the maximized value,
ut(O,st}l~bt), equals ut(1'sttl~bt) given (4.1). This verifies
that cst~ is an equilibrium.
The efficient outcome is supported if we select pl - 1,
with the corresponding p0, which we label p0}, given by
equation (4.1). The payoff to any player is u(1,1). Similarly,
the equilibrium with the lowest payoff in this class has p0 -
0, with payoff u(0,0). Since pl and p0 can be continuoualy
varied in this range, we can support any payoff in the interval
[u(0,0),u(1,1] . o
Note that if pl - 1, the equilibrium outcome path is pure,
as well as efficient. Further, if any player deviates from this
path, the economy reverts to the efficient path after a finite
number of periods with probability one. This strategy profile,
which we call MIXEDI, can be implemented by a two-state
automaton, as Fig 1. shows. MIXEDI is therefore as complex as
GRIM or RESILIENT, but it requires only one period memory.
Any deviant from MIXEDI ia punished only weakly, and does
not suffer a loss of utility. If every agent observe the
actions of the last two agents, we can construct a atrategy20
profile, MIXED2, which makes any deviant strictly worse off.
Fig 1 shows that MIXED2 has three states, and is hence more
complex than GRIM or RESILIENT, by the number of states
measure. Nevertheless, MIXED2 is an equilibrium with two-period
memory, whereas GRIM and RESILIENT require infinite memory.
In MIXEDI and MIXED2, and indeed in any informationally
economical equilibrium supporting the efficient outcome,
playera must take different actions at different observed
hiatories, and the equilibrium has to be constructed so that
this player is indifferent between these actions. We need to
use mixed strategies for this purpose - pure strategies are
either too nice or too grim. Since randomized punishments can
be fine tuned to be just right, it is posaible to induce an
agent take different actions at different information sets.
Nevertheleas, this knife-edge balance is unstable, as we shall
see in the next section.
The idea of theorem 2 could be generalized to prove an
informationally economical Folk theorem for a class of repeated
gamea played by overlapping generations of players which is
more general than that considered in this paper, thus
generalizing the results in Kandori (1992). However, we prefer,
in this paper, to focus on the robustness of theorem 2.
5. THE PERTURBED GAME
Are the mixed strategy equilibrium which support
altruiatic behavior robust? In this section we ask whether
these equilibria survive when each player's payoff function is
perturbed, and this perturbation is private information, in thezi
manner of Harsanyi (1973). We adapt the framework of van Damme
(1991, chapter 5) to our set up, which is of an extensive form
game.
Index agents by t as before. Recall that each agent's
action set, A, has k elements. Let R. Let Xt be a random
vector with values in a set Z in R2k.
Z-{xER2k. -cl ~ xl ~ cl, i- 1,2,..,2k}, c1~0 V i
Let u be a probability measure on Z.
The disturbed overlapping generatíons game is as follows:
i) Nature chooses an outcome xt of Xt for each agent t,
independently, and by the probability measure {~.
ii) Agent t, t-1,2,..., gets to know the outcome xt, and
nothing else.
iii) Agents 1 chooses an element of DA, having observed
xl. Each succeeding agent observea xt, and the observed
history bt, and chooses an element of AA.
iv) If at and at}1 are choaen, the payoff to the t-th




(5.1) shows that the payoff to agent t from any action
pair depends upon two componenta. The firat, v(.), ia common
to all agents, whereas the second, xt, is private information.
11n Informal ]lrgwnent
Before proceeding with our formal argument, it may be
useful to provide an intuitive argument for our main reault of
this section. Readers who prefer to akip such preliminarieszz
should proceed directly to the sub-section headed "The Formal
Analysis".
Our main theorem implies that the disturbed consumption
loan model has a unique equilibrium where each agent transfers
zero. Some intuition for the main point of the theorem can be
gained by considering why the mixed strategy equilibrium of the
previous section cannot be approximated in the disturbed game.
We simplify the game by allowing only two actions, 0 and 1. The
mixed strategy was:
(1,1) -) 1
(o, l) ) 1
(1, o) -) o
(0,0) -~ 1 with probability p0~, 0 with probability (1-
~
P )
To keep things simple, we perturb only one payoff, the
payoff u(0,1), so that the payoffs of agent t are:
ut(0,1) - v(0,1) t xt
ut(a,a') - v(a,a') for all other (a,a') in A2 (5.2)
where xt is i.i.d, on [-c,c] with a uniform density.
Let the last observed history be (a,0), where a is either
1 or 0. Consider agent t's payoff from the two actions, 1 and
0:
ut(l,sttl,(a,0) - v(1,1) (5.3)
ut(O,sttl~(a,0) - p0~ut(0,1) t (1-p0~) v(1,1)
(5.4)
The difference in payoff between the two actions, 1 and 0,
is:
ut(l,sttl~(a,0) - ut(O,sttl~(a,0) - xt p0~23
(5.5)
(5.6) shows that agent t has a unique best response unless
xt- 0, i.e. for almost all realizations of xt. Further, t will
choose 1 with probability one if xtc0, and 0 with probability
one if xt~0. Hence player t-1 should expect t to choose 1 with
probability 1~2, and to choose 0 with probability 1~2, if t-1
induces the history (0,0) or the history (1,0). In other words,
the aggregate strategy, st(0,0) - st(1,0), since st(a,0) is
uniquely determined by (5.5), no matter whether a- 1 or a
0. However, the strategy reguires t to take different actions
at (0,0) and (1,0). Hence, the strategy cannot be an
equilibrium.
The basic problem with che mixed strategy equilibrium is
that agent t is required to take different (probability
distributions over) actions at different information aets.
Since future agents cannot distinguish these information sets,
agent t must be induced to be indifferent between these
actions. Once payoffs are perturbed, these indifferences cannot
persist, since for almost all realizations of the private
information, the agent has a uniqué best action. Consequently,
the actions of the agent must depend only upon the private
information, and not upon the observed history.
We proceed to a formal analysis of the model.
The Formal 1lnalysis
A behavior strategy for agent t is now a Borel measurable
function, vt:Bt X Z ) AA. Two behavior strategies of agent t
are equivalent if, for every bt in Bt, they differ on a subaet
of Z of u-measure zero. Let st : Bt-) AA, and let St be the set24
of all such functions st. If Qt is a behavior strategy, Qt
induces an element st of St, defined by st:- fatdu. Call st the
aggregate of a~t. If player t plays Qt, to an outside observer,
and to all players ict, it seems as though t plays the
aggregate st of vt. Let Et be the set of behavior strategies
for player t, and let St denote the corresponding aggregates. A
behavior strategy profile, cv~, is a sequence of behavior
strategies, cQt~. Associated with this is the sequence of
aggregates, cst~.
Given Qt and bte Bt, write vt(bt) for the restriction of
vt to {bt}XZ, and write st(bt) for the associated aggregate.
Given an aggregate for player ttl, st}1, and bt, write sttl~bt
for the map from A to AA which is defined by the pair bt and
st}1. The interpretation is that if agent t takes action a e A
after hiatory bt, agent ttl is expected to take actions in A by
the probability measure st}1(a,bt).
At this point it is convenient to drop time subscripts,
since all agents are exante identical. Let x E Z be a
realization of private information for agent at an arbitrary
date t. The agent's utility function is hence u(a,a',x), where
a is the agent's own actíon, and a' is the action taken by
agent ttl. Let p:A~AA be an arbitrary function, and let
p(a'~a) denote the probability of action a' given a. The
interpretation is that p could be something similar to
sttl~bt'
Given any aeA, define:
u(a,p,x) :- Eu(a,a'x)p(a'~a) (5.6)
a'eA
u(a,p,x) denotes the payoff to t from action a conditionalzs
on the realization of private information x, given that p is
the aggregate strategy adopted by ttl after some observed
history. Define the following:
S(p,x) :- {a'EA:u(a',p,x) - max u(a,p,x)}
aEA
~(p,x) .- {aEAA:u(a,p,x) - max u(a,p,x)}
aEA
S(p) .- {9:Z-~AA : 6(x) E ~(p,x) }
~a(p) .- {xE Z : a E S(p,x)}
We now define the equilibrium concepts for the disturbed
overlapping generations game. The first notion is that of a
sequential equilibrium:
Definition 5.1 cvt~ is a sequential equilibrium, if for
every t, V bt E Bt:
a't(bt) E R(sttl~bt)
The equilibrium requirement implies that each player's
behavior strategy is a best response to the strategy adopted by
the next player, and implies that players have common beliefs
about the equilibrium to be played. Our main theorem however
can be proved without invoking the equilibrium assumption, and
only requires that strategies are seqaentially rationali2able.
We define this concept for our specific game; for a detailed
discussíon of rationalizability in extensive form gamea, see
Pearce (1984).
Let 9ts Et be a set of behavior strategies, and let c9t~
denote a sequence of such sets. Let Qt be the set of
aggregates corresponding to At, i.e.:
Qt :- { StE St : 3 O'tE 8t, st-J 0'td~!}
Definition 5.2 The sequence cAt~, 9ts Et, has the26
sequential best response property if v t:
vt E 9t ~ 3 cIttl E Qttl : Vbt E Bt, ~t (bt) E S~~Ittl~bt)
Definition 5.3 c6t~ is sequentially rationalizable if it
is the maximal sequence with the sequential best response
property, i.e. if cAt~ has the sequential best reponse
property, then 9t s 9t `d t. The set of sequentially




Henceforth we use the notation 9t to denote the set of
sequentially rationalizable strategies for player t, and 8 for
the set of sequentially rationalizable strategy profiles.
Note that if co~t~ is a sequential equilibrium, cvt~ is
sequentially rationalizable, while the converse is not true in
general. Rationalizability usually results in a proliferation
of outcomes. For example, in the consumption loan model with
infinite memory, the outcome path 1,0,0,0... cannot be an
equilibrium path whereas it can be rationalized. In a
rationalizable path, a player may get less than her
individually rational payoff, sínce expectations may not be
fulfilled.
The following assumptions on preferences and the
distribution of private information replace assumptions P1 and
P2 of section 3.
]1ss~ption D1 u is either decreasing in its first argument
or additively separable in its first two arguments for all
realizations of x.
1lsstnnption D2 u is absolutely continuous with respect to27
Lebsegue measure.
Our first lemma for this section follows from D2:
Lemma 5.1 Let a, a' e A. If a~ a', ~a(p) n~a~(p) has
u-measure zero.
Proof ~a(p) (j ~a~ ( p) -{x e Z: u(a,p,x) - u(a',p,x)}. If x
e ~a(p) (1 ~a (p), then:
~u(a,a",x)p(a"~a) - ~(a,,a",x)p(a"~a') (5.7)
a"eA a"eA
(5.7) defines a hyperplane of Lebesgue measure zero, and
hence of u-measure zero. o
Our second lemma follows from D1 and D2. If a e AA, write
~(a) to denote ~(p) for the case when p is the constant
function a.
Lemma 5.2 If a, a' e AA, S(a,x) -~(a',x) .- 7(x) for
almost all x. 7(x) can be chosen to be single element of A.
Proof If u is decreasing in its first argument, then it is
strictly decreasing for almo~r all realizations of x, i.e.
S(a,x) - S(a',x) -{0} for almost all x. If u is addivitely
separable in its first two arguments, ~(a, x) - S(a' , x) . Lemma
5.1 implies that these sets are singleton for almost all x. o
Since 2~(x) is a singleton set, 7:Z~A defines a Markov
strategy. More generally, a Harkov strategy is a function
wt:Z-~AA, with aggregate wt -~~tdu. Let n denote the set of
Markov strategies for any player, a set which is obviously
time-invariant. Suppose that every player is restricted to
playing a Markov strategy, i.e. the set A rather than the set
Et. If f~~ is a subset of fl, we call Sl~ Harkov rationalizable if
the constant sequence cn~~ satiafies the best response28
property, and it is the maximal subset of D which does so. The
lemmata 5.1 and 5.2 imply that the overlapping generations
economy has an essentially unique Markov rationalizable
sequence, i.e. all elements in ~t are equivalent to ~. It
also implies that a Markov rationalizable sequence is also a
Markov equilibrium. In the consumption loan model, each player
transfers zero after almost every realization of x in any
Markov equilibrium. We will extend this notion, and call a
behavior strategy profile a Markov equilibrium if it is
equivalent to 7. Note that we allow a Markov equilibrium to be
"non-Markovian" on sets of ineasure zero.
Definition 5.4 A behavior strategy profíle ~~t~ is a
Xarkov eqttilibrium if Vt, d bte Bt, vt(bt) is eguivalent to
7.
We make the same informational assumptions as in section
3, viz. Mi and M2. We extend the definitions of section 3
regarding the measurability of strategies in the following
manner.
Definition 5.5 A behavior strategy vt is measurable w.r.t.
-i if for any bt, bt e Bt with bt -i bt, the set of xt such
that (5.8) does not apply has u-measure zero:
vt(xt,bt) - vt(xt,bt) (5.8)
If vt is measurable w.r.t -i , it follows that the
associated aggregate st ia likewise measurable w.r.t. -i, i.e.
if bt -i bt, st(bt) - st(bt)
The following theorem shows that the overlapping
generations game with memory constraints has a unique
sequentially rationalizable outcome.29
Theorem 3 The disturbed overlapping generations game has
an essentially unique sequentially rationalizable outcome which
a Markov equilibrium. In the consumption loan model, every
agent transfers zero after every observed history.
Proof By assumption M2 we can fínd an agent with an
arbitrarily large index i who is not omnifamous. Hence 3 j~i
such that j e 71(i) . We show, by backward induction, that for
all t, i c t c j, that if vt e 9t, Qt is measurable w.r.t. -i.
i) Every strategy in Ej is measurable w.r.t. -i, since j
e 1L(i), and -i induces the trivial (finest possible) partition
of Bj, where each set in the partition is a singleton set.
Hence if Qj E 6j, aj is measurable w.r.t. -i.
ii)Let i c t c j. If every st}1 in Qt}1 is measurable
w.r.t. -i, then if Qt e Et, vt is measurable w.r.t. -i .
We now prove (ii). Let st}1 be measurable w.r.t -i, let
xt be any realization of Xt. and let bt -i bt. We claim that :
ut(o't' sttl ,bt' xt) - ut(~t' sttl Ibt,xt) (5.9)
Suppose not. Let
ut(~t' sttl ~bt' xt )' ut(~t' sttl
~bt,xt). Since bt -i bt,
btfl(vt(bt'xt)'bt) Vi bttl(Qt(bt,xt), bt)
(5.10)
Since
sttl is measurable w.r.t. -i,
stfl~bttl(Qt(bt'xt)'bt)] - stfl [bttl(vt(bt,xt),bt)]
(5.11)
Hence agent t ensures the payoff ut(~t' sttl~bt'xt) by
chooaing o~t(bt,xt), so that vt(bt,xt) is not optimal.
Hence if Qt e S(st}1)' (5.9) must hold.30
However, by lemma 5.1, for almost all realizations of xt,
agent t has a unique optimal action, so that for almost all
realizations of xt:
Pt(bt,xt) - Qt(bt,xt) (5.12)
Hence at is measurable w.r.t. -i, and hence st is
measurable w.r.t.
-i'
(i) and (ii) imply that si}1 is measurable w.r.t -i. By
lemma 5.2, player i's must choose ~(x) after every observed
history, and for almost all realizations of x.
We can now apply backward induction to players with index
less than i. If player i chooses an element 7(x) almost
everywhere after every history, the corresponding aggregate is
measurable w.r.t. Hence i-1 and every preceding player ~i-1'
chooses 7(x) for almoat all x irrespective of the observed
history. o
Remark 1: Our proof is based on backward induction, even
though the model has an infinite horizon. This is why we are
able to get our results with an extremely weak solution
concept, such as sequential rationalizability. Note that the
argument here is not open to some of the critiques of backward
induction, eg. Basu (1991). These critiques consider games such
as the centipede game, where although the game has a unique
backward induction outcome, a single player moves several
times. If such a player deviates from the backward induction
prescription, this contradicts the common knowledge of
rationality assumption, placing other players in a dilemma. In
our model each player moves only once. Should she deviate, this
has no implications for future behavior.31
Remark 2: The key element in theorem 3 is the use of
Harsanyi's (1973) device of perturbing player's payoffs. This
device yields powerful results: contrast theorem 2. This is, to
our knowledge, the first time that payoff perturbations ala
Harsanyi, have been used to refine equilibria significantly in
dynamic games.2 Perturbations, with incomplete information
about players types, have indeed been used in dynamic games,
and in some
equilibria.
cases, such perturbations have refined the set of




Levine (1989). These models rely upon "large"
i.e. there is some probability that a player
type,
is
playing a fixed atrategy. Our use of
quite different; in particular we do not
set Z, of possible realizations of private
perturbations is
require that the
information, be large. Indeed, the proof allows Z to be
arbitrarily small. A second qualitative difference between our
model and the above mentioned papers is that we have no
"reputation effects". Remark 1 is relevant here: aince each
player moves only once, there is no scope for building
reputation in our model.
6. PERFECT DIVISIBILITY OF THE TRIINSFERIIBLE C01~490DITY
We now examine the implications of allowing the
transferable commodity to be perfectly diviaible. In our view,
perfect divisibility is an unreasonable assumption. The
analysis here is mainly in order to demonatrate that the
difficulties with sustaining efficient outcomes do not atem
from this assumption. In this section, we show that with32
perfect divisibility one can support the efficient outcome by
pure strategies. However, these pure strategies turn out to be
non-robust once we perturb the utility function.
Let A- [O,e] and let u:AXA)R be the payoff function,
which satisfies C1.
]1ss~nnption C1. u(.) is continuous, and is strictly
decreasing in its first argument and strictly increasing in its
second argument.
As in section 4, label the efficient action as 1, i.e.
u(1,1) ~ u(a,a) V a e A. The interval [u(0,0),u(1,1)] is the
set of individually rational and feasible payoffs. If u~
belongs to this interval, by the intermediate value theorem, 3
a~, 0 c a~ ~ 1, such that u(a~,a~) - u~. The following theorem
says that any individually rational feasible payoff can be
supported by a pure strategy provided that each player observes
the action of the previous player.
Theorem 4 If each agent observes the action of the
previoua agent, any individually rational and feasible
payoff can be supported by a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof Given a u~, define a~ as above. Define the function
~:[O,a~] ~[O,a~] by the equation:
u(a,~(a)) - u(a~,a~) (6.1)
We first show that ~ is well defined. Let a e[O,a~]. By the
definition of at:
u(a,a) ~ u(a~,a~) (6.2)
Further, since u(.) is strictly decreasing in its first
argument:
u(a,a~) ~ u(a~,a~) (6.3)33
Since u(.) is continuous, the intermediate value theorem
implies that there exists a~(a), a~ ~~(a) ~ a, satisfying
(6.1). Since u is strictly increasing in its second
argument, this solution is unique, so that the function ~
is weil defined. We construct a pure strategy supporting at
which conditions only on the last observed action as followa:
sl - a~
If
at-1 ' a~' st - a~
If
at-1 ` a~' st - ~(at-1)
It may be verified that thia strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium. No matter what the observed hiatory, the
strategy ensures a payoff of u(a~,a~). If the agent deviates by
choosing any other transfer in [O,a~], she still geta only
u(a~,a~). If she deviates by choosing a transfer greater than
a~, she only gets a~ in the next period and hence her utility
is less than u(a~,a~). o
The pure strategies supporting the efficient allocation
are infinitely complex - indeed, they have an uncountable
number of states. Nevertheleas, they require only one period
memory. The contrast between the informational requirements of
a strategy and the Abreu-Rubinatein number of states measure of
complexity could hardly be more stark. If one believes that a
atrategy should be informationally economical and use few
states, this compels us to consider automata which output
randomized actions. As we noted in aection 3, the efficient
outcome can be supported by MIXEDI which requires only one-
period memory and two states.
We now show that this pure atrategy alao fails to survive34
if we perturb the payoff function. This is technically more
complicated since u is now infinite dimensional.
However, we adopt the procedure of parametrizing
u(.) by a single parameter, thereby reducing the
question of genericity of u(.) to that of this parameter. Let
ut be given by:
ut(a,a') - v(a,a') - xta (6.4)
where xt is independently and identically distributed
by the probability measure u on the set Z -[-c,c]. We
assume that c is sufficiently small that ut is increasing in
its first argument for all realizations of xt.
The following discussion mirrors that of section 5, and as
before we drop time subscripts. Let AA be the set of
probability measures over A. Let p:A~AA be Borel measurable,
and let p(a) denote the element of AA that is mapped into by a.
Define:
u(a,p,x) :- fu(a,a',x) p(a'~a) da' (6.5)
v(a,p) :- ~v(a,a') p(a'~a) da' (6.6)
Given (6.4), we have:
u(a,p,x) - fv(a,a') p(a'~a) da' - xa (6.7)
- v(a,p) -xa
Define S(p,x) as in the previous section. Given any
realization of private information, x, we define:
~~(P,x) :- [sup ~(p,x), inf S(p,x))
Given any probability measure over the strategies of
player ttl, p, and the realization of private information, x,
~t is the half-open interval constructed using the infimum and
aupremum of best reaponses of player t. If ~(p,x) is a35
singleton set, ~t is the null set; otherwise, it is an interval
of strictly positive length. Define further the set:
X(p) :- {x e Z: S~(p,x) ~ 0}
X(p) is the subset of Z for which player t has multiple
best responses to a given mixed strategy of player ttl. We are
now in a position to state the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 X(p) is at most countable and hence has
u-measure zero.
Proof Suppose x,x' are two realizations of X, with x~x'.
Let a E S(p,x) and a'e S(p,x'). From (6.7):
u(a,p,x) - u(a',p,x) - v(a,p) - v(a',p) t x(a-a') ~ o
(6.8)
u(a',p,x') - u(a,p,x') - v(a',p) - v(a,p) t x'(a'-a) ~ 0
(6.9)
Adding these inequalitiea we have:
(a-a')(x-x') ~ 0 (6.10)
Hence inf S(p,x) c sup ~(p,x'), which implies:
S~ (p,x) O fj' (p,x' ) - 0 (6.11)
(6.11) implies that for each x in X(p) we can find a
distinct rational number in ~~(p,x). Hence X(p) must be at most
countable since otherwise we have a one-to-one correspondence
between an uncountable set and a subset of the rationals. o
Given lemma 6.1, we can now replicate the proof of theorem
3 to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5 The disturbed consumption loan model with a
perfectly divisible commodity has a unique sequentially
rationalizable outcome where each agent transfers zero
irrespective of the observed history.36
7. THE INFORMATIONaL ROLE OF MONEY
We now consider the possibility that money may play an
informational role in the overlapping generations context, by
potentially allowing society to retain unbounded memory in some
situations. This allows society to support the efficient
outcome, even though information about past events is limited.
Conaider the simple model of our example, where the set of
actions A-{0,1}. In period one the old agent may issue,
(costlessly), a dated piece of paper which we call money. If
the young agent in period one transfers 1 to the old agent, she
is offered thia money in exchange. Every agent can acquire
money by one of two means: she may get it from the older agent
by transferring 1, or ahe may simply issue her own money.
Clearly the action sets of the agents are the same as
before. However, since money comes with the date of the issuing
agent, this gives rise to a different information structure. we
assume that in each period, the young agent has no knowledge of
the preceding actions. However, she may discern the date of the
agent who has isaued the money that is offered to her. Agent
t's observed history, bt, is now simply a date, i with z ~ t.
The set of possible observed histories, Bt, equals
{0,1,2,,...,t-1}. If agent t observes that the money offered to
has date t, she can infer that agent z has transferred 0, that
every agent after i has accepted the old's money, and has
therefore chosen 1. However, she can make no inference
regarding the behavior of agents before T.
Contrast this information structure with the case of m
period social memory, m~l. The information partitions of any37
agent under these two structures are not ordered, so that
neither can be considered more informative than the other.
Nevertheless, money allows social memory to be potentially
unbounded. If every agent accepts the money iasued by the first
old agent i.e. of date 0, future agents will have information
about all the actions taken by all agents. The potential
unboundedness of inemory allows us to support efficient
allocations in a robust way. For ease of exposition, we
consider the efficient allocation where every agent transfers 1
- the results extend in an obvious way to other efficient
allocations where the first k agents transfer 0, and agents
with index greater than ktl transfer 1.
Proposition 1. The efficient allocation can be supported
by the strategy profile GRIM, which is the unique efficient
pure strategy equilibrium. If any agent deviates and refuses
to accept money, money is never accepted subsequently so that
the continuation path is inefficient.
Proof Consider the partition of Ht into two sets: the
singleton set of conaisting of the history with ai - 1 v t ~ t,
and the set of all other histories where some player has chosen
0. This partition is coarser than Bt, and since GRIM is
measurable with respect to this partition, GRIM is a
sequentially rational equilibrium.
We now show that GRIM is the unique efficient equilibrium.
Let ~st~ be an efficient equilibrium, so that st(bt-0) - 1 V t.
Let st~}1(t~) - 1 for some t~~l. This implies stf(1) - 0,
contradicting the assumption that st(O) - 1 V t. If at~}1(t~) -
1, t~ gets a transfer of 1 next period by iasuing her own38
money, and hene will not accept money issued at date 0. o
Remark 1. Each agent has strict incentives to use GRIM at
every information aet, so that the equilibrium is robust to
small perturbations in the utility functions of agents as in
section 5.
The monetary equilibrium is however fragile in another
sense, since it is vulnerable to a"crazy" behavior by any one
generation. If any generation were to be foolish enough to
deviate, money never regains its value. In other words, the
loss ín confidence is permanent. This fragility is necessary
for the original equilibrium to be self-enforcing. Given
informational conatrainta, crises of confidence must be
devaetating, and long lasting. The informational role of money
hence provides a theory of monetary crisea of confidence.
8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper can be viewed as a contribution to the
literature on informational constraints in dynamic games, eg.
repeated gamea with imperfect monitoring as in Green and Porter
(1984). The overlapping generations framework provides a
natural way of introducing imperfect information, in a way
which is different from the repeated games literature.3 The
paper has also a bearing on the issue of strategic complexity.
As we have seen, simple atrategies may require infinite memory,
whereas a atrategy which requires only one-period memory may be
infinitely complex.
Our aubstantive results sound a note of caution with
regard to the poasibility of aupporting social cooperation in39
the context of finitely lived overlapping generations with
informational constraints, at least in the absence of
mechanisms for preserving infinite memory such as money. The
negative result in the arises from the informational assumption
is there is always an agent af sufficiently large index who is
not omnifamous, so that there is a subsequent agent who is
uninformed about i. This creates asymmetric information between
the those who are informed and those who are uninformed about
this agent. The simplest way of appreciating this point is to
consider the case of one period social memory, so that agent
ttl is informed about t's actions, but tt2 is not. Agent ttl
has private information about t's actions, and since theae do
not directly affect ttl's payoffs, agent ttl muat be
indifferent between the actions she takes at different
information sets. It is impoasible to construct a history-
dependent strategy for ttl which preserves this indifference in
a robust way, once we perturb the payoffs. This essential
argument extends, via backward induction, to more complex
information structures and greater social memory, provided that
the asymmetric information between the informed and the
uninformed persists.
An alternative way around this negative result is to get
rid of the asymmetric information. Suppose that agent ttl has
the same information about the past as agent t, with a high
probability (1-e), but with a small probability, e, has less
information. e could be a function of m, the size of inemory. In
such a model, society loses memory, but social forgetting is a
stochastic process, and agent t's information partition is40
stochastic. This generates a model which is formally quite
different from that analyzed in this paper, and therefore
requires separate analysis. The results in such a model depend
upon the assumption one makes about e. If e(m) is sufficiently
small no matter how large m is, then one can support inter-
generational transfers. This is possible since if e(m) is
always very small, then any pair of adjacent agents, t and ttl,
always have almost the same information. However, if e(m)
becomes large at very large values of m, the results are
similar to those in this paper. The basic point is that in the
stochastic model, any generation and its successor have
essentially symmetric information about the past - with high
probability they have the same information. It is not clear to
us that thia is more persuasive than the model analyzed in this
paper. In our view asymmetric information about the past is an
essential difference between generations who are born at
different dates. The deterministic model, we would argue,
captures this asymmetry better than a stochastic model.
The results of this paper also apply to repeated two-
player games played by overlapping generations of players,
where where the old player has a dominant strategy. This runs
counter to much of the recent literature on dynamic games
played by overlapping generations of players - eg. Kandori
(1992) and Smith (1992). The anti-folk theorem presented here
does not necessarily generalize to the general games played by
overlapping generations of players. If there are three or more
players in each generation who share the same information about
the past, a non-cooperative equilibrium can be constructed41
where they are induced to reveal this information to future
generations. One may therefore be able to prove an
informationally economical Folk theorem for auch games as
Kandori (1992) suggests. Such an equilibrium is however
vulnerable to collusion between agents of the same generation.
We leave a complete analysis of these games for future work.42
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